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INTRODUCTION 
Does the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) reduce violence against 
women? CEDAW has the distinction of being an unusually effective 
human rights treaty: promoting women’s political rights in particular, 
having a modest effect on women’s social rights, but showing little 
or no effect on economic rights.1 However, unlike these other rights, 
the CEDAW Treaty does not explicitly mention violence. The 
CEDAW Committee interpreted the Treaty as covering gender 
violence after the fact. It issued General Recommendations in 1989 
and 1992 mandating states to collect information and take action on 
the issue, respectively.2 The Committee’s advocacy on the issue of 
                                                     
 * Neil Englehart is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Bowling 
Green State University. He wishes to thank Melissa K. Miller, his co-author on a 
larger CEDAW-related project, Holly Cipriani for invaluable research assistance, 
and the participants in the Michigan State University Law Review Symposium on 
Whether the U.S. Should Become a Party to the U.N. Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Nov. 7, 2013) for their helpful 
comments. 
 1. Neil A. Englehart & Melissa K. Miller, The CEDAW Effect: 
International Law’s Impact on Women’s Rights, 13 J. HUM. RTS. 22 (2014). 
 2. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, 8th Sess., Feb. 20-Mar. 3, 1989, ¶ 392, U.N. Doc. A/44/38; GAOR, 44th 
Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1990) [hereinafter 8th Sess. Report]; Rep. of the Comm. on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 11th Sess., Jan. 20-30, 1992, at 2, 
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violence raises interesting issues in international law: To what degree 
can a treaty body raise issues not explicitly included in treaty law, to 
what degree will states comply with its recommendations on these 
issues, and how effective will such advocacy be? This Article 
examines these questions empirically, looking at how states have 
responded to the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations 
on gender violence, and the degree to which their responses have 
been effective on the ground. 
I. THE CEDAW COMMITTEE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
The CEDAW Committee’s advocacy on the issue of violence 
against women is based on two recommendations issued years after 
the Treaty came into force. The first of these, General 
Recommendation 12, was issued in 1989. It asks States parties to 
include information on violence against women in their reports to the 
Committee, including discussing what legislative and other measures 
they have taken on the matter.3 This recommendation thus requires 
states to collect information on violence against women and 
introduces a presumption that States parties will actively work on the 
issue. The second is General Recommendation 19, issued in 1992. 
This is more comprehensive and more strongly worded. It asserts 
that States parties are obligated to fight gender violence based on the 
definition of discrimination in Article 1 of the Treaty4:  
[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which 
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a 
basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other 
field.5 
General Recommendation 19 thus makes a claim that States 
parties are obligated by CEDAW to work against violence against 
women, although the word violence never occurs in this definition of 
discrimination or anywhere else in the Treaty. Furthermore, this 
obligation consists not just of refraining from state violence, but also 
                                                                                                                
U.N. Doc. A/47/38; GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1993) [hereinafter 11th Sess. 
Report]. 
 3. 8th Sess. Report, supra note 2, ¶ 392. 
 4. 11th Sess. Report, supra note 2, at 1. 
 5. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 16 (entered into 
force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
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preventing violence by others, including private actors.6 Indeed, the 
CEDAW Committee argues that States parties are obligated to not 
just pass and enforce laws against gender violence, but also to 
change attitudes and social dynamics that lead to violence against 
women.7  
Gender violence entered the discourse of U.N. women’s rights 
advocacy at the 1985 Nairobi Conference assessing the results of the 
U.N. Decade for Women. The Nairobi Conference’s concluding 
document mapped out strategies for future U.N. efforts for the 
advancement of women and included, among other things, a 
statement that “[g]overnments should undertake effective measures . 
. . to identify, prevent and eliminate all violence, including family 
violence, against women and children.”8 The issue was not a major 
topic at the conference, however, and its inclusion in the forward-
looking strategies was almost an afterthought.9 However, the 
Division for the Advancement of Women convened an expert group 
meeting on gender violence in 1986, and the Economic and Social 
Council of the U.N. (ECOSOC) subsequently reaffirmed the goals of 
the Nairobi Conference and invited the Commission on the Status of 
Women (CSW) to take action on the issue of violence against 
women.10 On this basis, the CSW drafted a Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women (Declaration) in 1991.11 The 
Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly in 1993, which 
invoked CEDAW, as well as other human rights treaties, in doing 
                                                     
 6. 11th Sess. Report, supra note 2, at 2. 
 7. Id. at 4. 
 8. Rep. of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the 
Achievements of the U.N. of the Decade for Women: Equality, Development and 
Peace, Nairobi, Kenya, July 15-26, 1985, ¶ 231, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.116/28/Rev.1 
(1986). 
 9. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Preliminary Rep. Submitted by the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, ¶ 21, 
Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (Nov. 22, 1994) (by 
Radhika Coomaraswamy). 
 10. E.S.C. Res. 1987/24, at 18-19, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1987/87 (May 26, 
1987). 
 11. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 
48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49 (Vol. I), U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (Vol. 1), 
at 217-19 (Dec. 20, 1993); see also AMNESTY INT’L, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 
IN THE UNITED NATIONS: DEVELOPMENTS 1993-1994, at 2 (1995), available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR51/001/1995/es/c3aae30e-eb6a-11dd-
b8d6-03683db9c805/ior510011995en.pdf.  
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so.12 The General Assembly resolution adopting the Declaration also 
encouraged states to ratify CEDAW and to create laws, programs, 
and institutions to address violence against women.13 
The CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations of 1989 
and 1992 were thus part of a sequence of events taking place within 
the U.N. system addressing violence against women. It is notable, 
however, that the CEDAW Committee was at the forefront of this 
process. It acted more quickly than the CSW, even in the absence of 
a specific mandate from ECOSOC. The character of General 
Recommendations 12 and 19 is different from the Declaration as 
well because the Declaration is a statement of principles, whereas the 
General Recommendations are binding on CEDAW parties. The 
CEDAW Committee did not invent the U.N. system’s concern with 
the issue of gender violence from whole cloth. It tapped into ongoing 
discussions at the Nairobi Conference, ECOSOC, the CSW, and the 
Division for the Advancement of Women. However, the CEDAW 
Committee’s actions were more timely, more aggressive, and more 
binding than the more modest efforts of these other U.N. 
organizations. 
II. STATE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO GENERAL RECOMMENDATION 19 
Governments might well argue that they had not intended to 
take action on the issue of gender violence when they ratified 
CEDAW, since violence is not mentioned in the text of the treaty. If 
so, we might then expect low levels of compliance with the General 
Recommendations. To what degree have States parties responded to 
General Recommendation 19 in particular? The results presented in 
Figures 1–4 suggest that actually there has been a high degree of 
compliance.14 
                                                     
 12. G.A. Res. 48/104, supra note 11, at 217. 
 13. Id. at 218. 
 14. The data in Figures 1–4 have been compiled from several sources. The 
primary source has been the periodic reports submitted by CEDAW States parties, 
which require the States parties to report on their implementation of the treaty. 
Country Reports, U.N. WOMEN, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ 
reports.htm (last updated Dec. 28, 2007). These data were supplemented and 
checked in some cases by reference to government and NGO reports. Data for non-
parties and States parties that have failed to submit reports were collected from U.N. 
documents and websites, most notably the Secretary General’s database on violence 
against women, U.N. Secretary General’s Database on Violence Against Women, 
U.N. WOMEN, http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/home.action (last visited Apr. 7, 
2014), as well as government and NGO data sources.  
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Figure 1 shows the number of states that have enacted anti-
gender violence laws, including both constitutional provisions and 
statutes.15 Such laws were very rare until the early 1990s, but in 1992 
the number suddenly begins to increase, rising steadily until 2011. 
Furthermore, the increase is almost entirely among the States parties 
with the non-party trend remaining steady at one to two countries in 
each year for the entire series. 
Similarly, States parties are far more likely to have institutions 
specifically tasked with preventing gender violence than non-parties, 
as seen in Figure 2, which counts the number of states having either 
gender-violence programs or government agencies specifically 
tasked with reducing gender violence.16 Once again, the trend for 
both groups is nearly identical until the early 1990s when the 
CEDAW party line increases dramatically, beginning in 1993. 
As seen in Figure 3, constitutional provisions and legislation 
specifically targeting domestic violence is more common than those 
targeting gender violence more broadly, but we see the same trend: it 
is nearly non-existent until the early 1990s when there is a sudden 
increase among the States parties.17 Here, the upward trend among 
the States parties began in 1990, following General Recommendation 
12, rather than after General Recommendation 19 in 1992. The non-
party trend remains basically flat at two to three countries per year. 
Figure 4 displays the number of countries with institutions 
responsible for preventing and addressing domestic violence.18 Once 
again, the number of non-parties with such institutions remains 
basically flat, while the States parties show a sharp increase after 
1992. 
It seems incontrovertible that the CEDAW Committee’s 
General Recommendations 12 and 19, from 1989 and 1992 
respectively, had an impact on the behavior of States parties. The 
increase precedes the General Assembly’s adoption of the 
Declaration, but comes well after the issue was first raised at the 
Nairobi Conference in 1985. Furthermore, only the CEDAW parties 
show an increasing likelihood of having laws and institutions aimed 
at addressing gender and domestic violence. While it is true that 
many states were ratifying CEDAW during this period, increasing 
the number of States parties, this increase explains neither the rapid 
                                                     
 15. See infra Figure 1. 
 16. See infra Figure 2. 
 17. See infra Figure 3. 
 18. See infra Figure 4. 
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rise in the laws and institutions created by States parties only after 
the early 1990s, nor the large discrepancy between the behavior of 
States parties and non-parties. The increase coincides exactly with 
the General Recommendations: in no case is there a substantial 
increase among the States parties prior to 1989, and the sharpest 
increases come after 1992. It thus seems that General 
Recommendations 12 and 19 had a decisive effect in motivating 
States parties to take action.  
Enacting laws and creating institutions are not, however, the 
same as taking effective action. Laws may be poorly enforced, for 
instance, and institutions may be underfunded and understaffed. 
Furthermore, the mandate to change deeply held attitudes and 
practices that lead to violence against women is ambitious, and may 
exceed the capacity of many states.19 Thus, we turn next to 
evaluating the effectiveness of state action. 
III. THE EFFECTS OF STATE ACTION 
To what degree has state action been effective at reducing 
violence against women? There are substantial obstacles to assessing 
this empirically. Cross-national data is likely to be confounded by 
differing definitions of violence against women used in different 
jurisdictions and by differences in rates of reporting that are linked to 
cultural stigmas, trust in police and other government institutions, 
and a host of other factors. Ideally, we would like to track changes 
over time within countries to elucidate the temporal dynamics of any 
changes associated with implementing General Recommendations 12 
and 19. However, little time-series data is available. Furthermore, in 
cases where successful action has been undertaken, the data are 
likely to be confounded by the paradox of reporting: as women 
become aware that laws exist to help them and as the stigma against 
reporting such crimes declines, reporting rates go up, making it 
appear that the incidence of violence against women is increasing 
regardless of what may actually be happening. 
Rather than abandoning any attempt to address the question of 
effectiveness, the best data available is analyzed here. Its limitations 
must, however, be kept firmly in mind as the question of 
effectiveness is explored in a preliminary way. 
To explore the incidence of violence against women, the 
weighted rape score available from Womenstats is employed here. 
                                                     
 19. See 11th Sess. Report, supra note 2, at 4-5. 
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This variable is meant to mitigate the well-known problems of 
comparing rape statistics across countries. It is based on official rape 
statistics, but weights them according to varying legal definitions of 
rape and the strength of taboos and other impediments to reporting. 
The weighted scale ranges from 0 (little or no rape) to 4 (high 
incidence of rape).20 The primary limitation of this data is that it is 
only available for a single year (2011). This means that we cannot 
use it to track changes over time in response to the Committee’s 
General Recommendations. It can only be used to compare countries 
in that one year. 
The primary explanatory variables in the models in Table 1 and 
Table 2 are the laws and institutions created by countries.21 As we 
have seen in Figures 1–4, states are far more likely to create such 
laws and institutions if they are party to CEDAW.22 Here laws and 
institutions are represented as dummy variables, with 0 indicating 
that a country does not have a qualifying law/institution and 1 
indicating that it does.23 A dummy variable for CEDAW ratification 
is also included to test whether ratification of CEDAW has an effect 
even without the creation of a violence-specific law or institution. 
In addition, three control variables are included in the models: 
tax as a proportion of GDP, GDP per capita, and urbanization. Tax as 
a proportion of GDP is employed as a measure of state capacity, 
reflecting each state’s ability to enforce laws and operate institutions 
effectively.24 GDP per capita is included as a measure of economic 
development, which has widely been found to influence respect for 
human rights in general.25 Urbanization is included because crime 
tends to be higher in urban areas, and a higher proportion of urban 
residents would, therefore, lead to a higher incidence of rape, all 
                                                     
 20. For details on the construction and weighting of the score, see 
Codebook, WOMENSTATS, http://womanstats.org/CodebookCurrent.htm#LRW (last 
updated Mar. 2014). 
 21. See infra Tables 1–2. 
 22. See infra Figures 1–4. 
 23. See infra Tables 1–2. 
 24. For a discussion of tax as a proportion of GDP as an indicator of state 
capacity, see Neil A. Englehart, State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights, 
46 J. PEACE RES. 163, 168 (2009). The data used here are an updated version of the 
data employed in that article. 
 25. This finding goes back to the earliest quantitative work on human 
rights. See Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Note, Economic and Political 
Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476, 478-79 (1988). It 
has been replicated in innumerable subsequent studies. For replication in the context 
of CEDAW, see generally Englehart & Miller, supra note 1. 
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other things being equal. The variable indicates the proportion of the 
population of each country living in urban areas.26 
As Table 1 shows, the Womenstats data offers limited and 
inconsistent support for the idea that Recommendations 12 and 19 
have significantly affected the incidence of rape, although the results 
are somewhat inconclusive.27 Table 1 separately assesses statutes and 
programs against gender violence and domestic violence. None of 
these has a statistically significant effect. Furthermore, the 
coefficients for laws and institutions against gender violence are 
positive, indicating that they are associated with higher incidence of 
rape. Law and institutions against domestic violence, which are more 
numerous, have negative coefficients. Domestic violence laws are 
significant at the .10 level, indicating that they are associated with 
less rape. 
It is impossible to interpret statistically insignificant results, 
since by definition they could be the product of random variation and 
not indicative of real relationships. On the other hand, there are 
reasons we might give some weight to these results. The small 
number of cases (N) contributes to the inconclusive results, since it is 
difficult to derive statistically significant results from small samples. 
On the other hand, the data covers a large proportion of existing 
states—approximately two-thirds of the countries in the world—
suggesting the results may be somewhat more reliable than normal 
with such a small sample. 
Most of the control variables behave as expected in these 
models. Urbanization is associated with more rape, although its 
impact is very small and not statistically significant. Tax as a 
proportion of GDP and GDP per capita are both statistically 
significant and associated with less rape, probably reflecting better 
law-enforcement capabilities on the part of higher-income and 
higher-capacity states. 
Surprisingly, CEDAW ratification is not only not significant, 
but also has a positive coefficient, indicating it is associated with 
more rape. This result is somewhat puzzling, like the positive finding 
for anti-gender violence laws and institutions. One possible reason 
for both findings may be that the models presented in Table 1 do not 
                                                     
 26. Data for GDP per capita and urbanization are drawn from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators. World Development Indicators, WORLD 
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (last 
updated Dec. 18, 2013). 
 27. See infra Table 1. 
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allow enough time for the effects of the treaty and gender-violence 
measures to become effective. 
Table 1 shows results with a one-year lag, so the models 
predict the incidence of rape one year after the independent variables 
were measured. Laws and institutions may, however, only produce 
measureable results after a longer period of time. Indeed, the positive 
coefficients for gender-violence institutions and laws could indicate 
that they tend to be created in places where they are especially 
needed and that they take more than one year to be implemented. To 
test for this, Table 2 shows results for a five-year lag: the 
independent variables predict results five years into the future. 
In Table 2 all the variables of interest—gender violence laws 
and institutions, and domestic violence laws and institutions—have 
negative coefficients.28 They are therefore associated with less rape. 
However, none are statistically significant, except for domestic-
violence institutions. Once again, the problem of a small N is 
probably interfering with the results, making it more difficult to 
achieve statistical significance. Again, however, the data captures a 
relatively large proportion of the universe of existing countries, 
suggesting we might have more confidence in the results than we 
ordinarily would with such low-significance scores. 
CEDAW also takes on a negative coefficient in these models 
and is statistically significant across all four models. Again, it 
appears that one year is not sufficient time for the Treaty’s effects to 
become manifest, but they do become apparent after a longer time 
span.29 
The other control variables again behave much as expected. 
Urbanization has a positive effect, but it is very small and not 
statistically significant.30 Tax as a proportion of GDP and GDP per 
capita are both significant again, and have negative coefficients. 
The rape data thus does not offer strong confirmation that 
States parties efforts to comply with the CEDAW Committee’s 
General Recommendations 12 and 19 have reduced violence against 
women, but neither does it rule out that possibility. The difference 
between the one- and five-year-lagged models does suggest that the 
impacts of these laws and institutions take some years to become 
effective. This conclusion makes considerable intuitive sense: it 
takes time for bureaucracies to gear up to enforce new laws and 
                                                     
 28. See infra Table 2. 
 29. Compare infra Table 1, with infra Table 2.  
 30. See infra Table 2. 
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formulate new programs, for public awareness to spread, and for 
people to change their behavior. However, the absence of statistical 
significance indicates that the findings for gender-violence laws and 
institutions, as well as for domestic-violence laws, must be treated 
with extreme caution, even in the five-year-lag models. Although 
they generally point in the expected direction in the five-year-lagged 
models in Table 2, the lack of statistical significance indicates that 
the findings could be due to random variation rather than real causal 
patterns. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, States parties have done a lot to comply with General 
Recommendations 12 and 19, but with limited effect. CEDAW 
States parties are far more likely to pass laws against gender and 
domestic violence than non-parties and are more likely to create anti-
violence laws and programs. However, this has only been true since 
the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations were issued, 
providing strong evidence that these new initiatives are a direct 
product of the General Recommendations. However, those laws and 
programs have an uncertain, and at best modest, effect on violence 
against women. Furthermore, these effects take several years to 
become manifest. 
The finding that States parties have complied with General 
Recommendations 12 and 19 is interesting from the perspective of 
international law. In the literature on treaty compliance, there is a 
tendency to treat international agreements as static.31 Once States 
parties ratify and accept the obligations entailed in the treaty, 
attention generally focuses on what States parties do or do not do to 
comply. However, treaties such as CEDAW that have committees 
and reporting requirements are not complete at the moment of 
ratification. Rather, they provide for ongoing consultation and 
negotiation among States parties about the meaning of the text.32 In 
some cases, such as the CEDAW Committee’s recommendations 
about gender violence, this may lead to important changes in the 
expectations for the behavior of States parties, even without any 
                                                     
 31. See generally THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Skkink eds., 
2006); SONIA CARDENAS, CONFLICT AND COMPLIANCE: STATE RESPONSES TO 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRESSURE (2007); BETH A. SIMONS, MOBILIZING 
FOR RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009).  
 32. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 5, at 22. 
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formal renegotiation of the text. Indeed, States parties cannot even 
lodge reservations against such changes. 
The second finding, that the actions of States parties have only 
a modest effect on the incidence of gender violence, and only after 
several years, presents an important caution against inflated 
expectations of the impact of treaty law. This is especially pertinent 
to the newer wave of human rights treaties, such as CEDAW, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which require not just that States 
parties abstain from abuse, but also that they seek to transform social 
structures and individual attitudes associated with discrimination and 
abusive practices.33 States parties may often lack the ability to effect 
such transformations, regardless of how willing they may be to make 
the attempt. 
Treaty compliance is often framed, rather simplistically, as a 
matter of state will.34 The presumption is that if States parties wish to 
comply, they will and that failure to comply must indicate that 
governments have ratified for cynical reasons, without intending to 
comply.35 However, the results above point to a more complex 
reality. Many States parties were willing to comply with General 
Recommendations 12 and 19 by passing laws and creating 
institutions. However, these institutions and laws have at best a 
modest effect on gender violence. 
Sally Engle Merry argues that human rights treaties are 
important for the cultural work they do, shaping the perceptions and 
worldview of elites to conform to a vision of international 
modernity.36 The finding that states rapidly conformed to General 
Recommendations 12 and 19, despite their rather loose basis in the 
treaty itself, suggests that Engle is correct about elite responsiveness. 
The wider cultural and social changes that might follow from this 
shift in elite attitudes are beyond the scope of this paper; the data do 
not support the analysis of such long-term change. The fact that the 
                                                     
 33. See id. at 16; Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 2, ¶ 1, opened 
for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990); 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 3, opened for signature 
Mar. 20, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008). 
 34. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International 
Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1842 (2002). 
 35. See id. at 1841-43. 
 36. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: 
TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 100-02 (William M. O’Barr 
& John M. Conley eds., 2006). 
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coefficients for laws and institutions become negative with a five-
year lag is, however, suggestive of a deeper change. Not 
surprisingly, international law—at least in the case of violence 
against women—appears to require some time to trickle down from 
elite commitments and through national institutions before it can 
produce social and cultural change at the grassroots. 
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Table 1: 
Predictors of Womenstats Weighted Rape Score, one year lag 
 
Gender 
Violence 
Law 
.07 (.18)    
Domestic 
Violence 
Law 
 -.26† (.16)   
Gender 
Violence 
Institution 
  .08 (.15)  
Domestic 
Violence 
Institution 
   -.11 (.17) 
Urban 
Population .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) 
Tax/ GDP -2.89** (.92) 
-3.02** 
(.91) 
-2.80** 
(.92) 
-3.34** 
(.96) 
CEDAW .13 (.89) .01 (.87) .12 (.88) .04 (.88) 
GDP per 
capita -.43** (.11) -.40** (.11) -.43** (.11) -.39** (.12) 
Constant 6.70** (1.20) 
6.72** 
(1.18) 
6.62** 
(1.19) 
6.57** 
(1.19) 
N 132 132 130 129 
R2 .43 .44 .41 .44 
 
OLS regression: **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .10.  
Numbers in brackets are standard errors.  
Sources: Womenstats, World Bank World Development Indicators, 
United Nations.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
37.     See supra notes 20, 24-26.  
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Table 2: 
Predictors of Womenstats Weighted Rape Score, five year lag 
 
Gender 
Violence 
Law 
-.07 (.20)    
Domestic 
Violence 
Law 
 -.17 (.16)   
Gender 
Violence 
Institution 
  -.02 (.10)  
Domestic 
Violence 
Institution 
   -.19* (.10) 
Urban 
Population .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) 
Tax/ GDP -2.58** (.82) 
-2.63** 
(.83) 
-3.08** 
(.91) 
-2.63** 
(.82) 
CEDAW -1.25* (.62) -1.19† (.62) -1.17† (.61) -1.23* (.61) 
GDP per 
capita -.40** (.11) -.38** (.11) -.34** (.11) -.37** (.11) 
Constant -7.82** (.96) 
-7.59** 
(1.00) 
-7.38** 
(1.00) 
7.59** 
(.96) 
N 142 141 138 138 
R2 .45 .45 .46 .46 
 
OLS regression: **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .10.  
Numbers in brackets are standard errors.  
Sources: Womenstats, World Bank World Development Indicators, 
United Nations.38 
                                                     
38.     See supra notes 20, 24-26 
